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III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on this Court by an
Order of the Utah Supreme Court dated May 3, 1994, transferring
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals in accordance with Utah Code
Ann.

Section 78-2-2 (4) (1991)
IV.
1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Whether the trial court erred in failing to give an

instruction pursuant to Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P. 2d 1224
(Utah App.

1992) , stating

that

a property

owner may be

held

negligent when the property owner's method of operation creates a
situation where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable
acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition or defect.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in taxing witness fees

against plaintiff

in excess of the subpoena amount allowed by

statute.
V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision to give an instruction is a legal conclusion.

It

is examined by the appellate court for correctness, giving no
deference to the trial court.

Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan,

818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476
(Utah 1992).
An award of costs is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Ct. App. 1990).
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VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS

Utah Code Annotated Section 21-5-4.
1.

Fees and mileage.

Every juror and witness legally required or in good faith

requested to attend a trial court of record or not of record or a
grand jury is entitled to:
(a)

$17 for each day in attendance; and

U.C.A. Section 21-5-8:
The fees and compensation of witnesses in all civil causes
must be paid by the party who causes such witnesses to attend...
The fees of witnesses paid in civil causes may be taxed as
costs against the losing party.
VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

1.

Jensen brought this action to recover damages when he

slipped and fell in a fuel loading dock at the Phillips Refinery on
December 26, 1990, at approximately 8:30 a.m.
2.

Mr. Jensen's treating physician was deposed by Phillips

and the deposition was used at trial.
$300.00 deposition fee.

Phillips paid the doctor a

His fee was imposed as a taxable cost on

Mr. Jensen after jury trial in an amended judgment.
B.

Nature of the Proceedings

This case was tried to a jury on February 16, 1994.
4

Jensen

requested

the instruction contained in the appendix.

After a

defense jury verdict, a $300.00 deposition fee was taxed against
plaintiff over his objection.
C.

Disposition of the Trial Court

The trial court refused to give the Canfield instruction,
stating that Canfield requires an "itinerant kind of act."
Subsequent

to the entry of judgment, Phillips asked

certain costs be taxed to plaintiff.

that

The court allowed a $300.00

deposition fee for the treating physician to be taxed despite the
requirements of Utah Code Annotated Section 21-5-4, allowing only
$17.00 for each day in attendance of a witness in a trial court of
record.

This cost was included in an amended judgment.

D.

Statement of Facts

In the light most favorable to the jury verdict:
1.

On December 26, 1990, Mr. Jensen slipped on fluids in a

fuel loading bay of the Phillips Refinery.

(Transcript, herein

after, "T", 34-35.)
2.

Mr. Jensen

fell while

loading

fuel

into his

truck.

During loading he braced his leg and forced the fuel loading arm
onto his truck. (T. 34,46).
3.
his truck.
4.

Plaintiff was aware the area was slick when he got out of
(T. 49) .
Phillips was aware that fuel spills occurred at the fuel
5

bays.

(T. 89).

Phillips provided a water hose to wash down the

fuel spills. (Id). Phillips also provided a squeegee to push the
water down the drain. (T. 90) . However, this squeegee was kept in
the office, not by the loading bay.

(T. 98) . Further, salt and a

shovel were provided near the loading bay.
5.

At

Id.

times, Phillips employees did observe

ice on the

ground at the loading bay. (T. 91). Phillips knew that this area
of the refinery needed to be salted. (T. 94).

Indeed, this dock

where the accident occurred received first priority in snow removal
and salting.

Id.

Phillips was aware that snow, ice, and petroleum

products all cause slippery conditions. (T. 96). Phillips did not
always wash the fuel down. (T. 97) .

Further, the water used to

wash the fuel down caused additional slipperiness.
22 - 24) .
pumps.

(T. 97, lines

Additionally, that water can freeze in front of the

(T. 98).

Further, having a truck through the loading bay

spreading salt is insufficient.

(T. 95). Additionally, the area

must be re-salted on occasion because of slippery conditions.

(T.

95) . Phillips had no set time requiring the areas to be rechecked.
(T. 95-96) .
6.

No warning signs existed concerning slippery conditions.

(T. 98). Additionally, an imbedded metal grate was considered to
help with

slippery

accident occurred.

conditions, but was not present
(T. 98-99).
6

when

this

FACTS REGARDING THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
7.
following

After submission of evidence, plaintiff requested the
Canfield instruction:
Where the landowner's method of operation
creates a situation where it is reasonably
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third
parties will create a dangerous condition or
defect, the landowner may be found negligent.

(R. 223-225, T. 110, instruction attached in Appendix A.
8.

The defendant also submitted a Canfield instruction which

was declined by the court.
Appendix B ) .

(T. 110, R. 46, copy of instruction in

The defense instruction proposed the following:

In determining whether a business owner was
negligent, the inquiry is whether the owner or
its employees knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, that a
dangerous condition existed, and whether
sufficient time elapsed such that corrective
action could have been taken to remedy the
situation. Property owners are not insurers
against all forms of actions that may happen
to any who come.
Whether the business owner chooses a method
of
operation
where
it
is
reasonably
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third
parties will create a dangerous condition, an
injured party need not prove either actual or
constructive
knowledge
of
the
specific
condition.
In such a case, the relevant
question is whether the business owner took
reasonable precautions to protect customers
against the dangerous condition.
9.

In rejecting both Canfield instructions the court held:
First of all, let me just say, I don't think
that this is a case for the Canfield
7

instruction as proposed by Mr. Dalton.
For
one thing, that case presupposes that it's an
itinerant kind of act that's there that the
owner would have notice of.
I don't think
this fits within that category.
I think in
fact that this is one of those cases where the
hazard essentially has been created by the
owner, if in fact one has been created, and
therefore he has notice of that and that's not
required.
Now, I don't think instruction 19 from MUJI
essentially is different than that of Canfield
as far as the plaintiffs are concerned. First
of all, the instruction places the burden on
the owner to use reasonable care, and I think
that's what the standard is. It goes somewhat
further in that it says if you actually have
notice of the defect, then you have to post
notice. So I don't think this is a statement
of the present standard of the law in the
State of Utah of reasonable care, and that's
what this is, it required that the owner of
the property keep the premises in a condition
reasonably safe for business invitees, and
that the personal property of the business
invitee be brought
to the premises
in
reasonable pursuit of purposes embraced within
the invitation. (T. 110)- 1
10.

Counsel for the plaintiff agreed to accept the defense

Canfield instruction if his was declined. (T. 109).
11.

Instead, the court gave the following instruction:
One who extends to a business invitee an
invitation, express or implied, is obliged to
refrain from acts of negligence and to
exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in
a condition reasonably safe for the business
invitee and the personal property of the

1

. Jensen also objected to the "business invitee" language of
the proposed instruction. That objection is not pursued on appeal.
8

business invitee brought to the premises in
the reasonable pursuit of a purpose embraced
within the invitation.
The business invitee has a right to assume
that the premises to which the business
invitee was invited are reasonably safe for
the purposes for which the invitation was
extended,
unless
the
business
invitee
observes, or a reasonably prudent person in
like position would observe, conditions that
caution otherwise.
The responsibility of one having control of
the premises is not absolute; it is not that
of an insurer. If there is danger associated
with the entry, or the work which the business
invitee is to do on the premises, that arises
from conditions not readily apparent to the
senses, and if the owner has actual knowledge
of such danger, or if such danger is
discoverable by the owner in the exercise of
reasonable care, it is the duty of the owner
to giver reasonable warning of such danger to
the business invitee. The owner is not bound
to
discover
defects
which
reasonable
inspection would not disclose.
(Emphasis
added). Appendix C.
TAXING OF COSTS
12.

Subsequent to the jury verdict and judgment, defense

sought to tax costs against plaintiff.
13.

The defense

expert, Dr. Paulos.
trial.

had

taken the deposition

of

plaintiff's

This deposition was read into the record at

(See T. 56).

14.

Defendant paid Dr. Paulos $300.00 for his deposition

testimony.
15.

The court granted the $300.00 payment over the objection
9

of plaintiff in an amended judgment.
VIII.
1.

The

court

(R. 241)

(See Appendix C) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

committed

reversible

error

in

issuing

an

instruction requiring plaintiff to show that the landowner knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable

care, should have known of the

defect:
2.

Plaintiff is not required to pay the $300.00 witness fee

for Dr. Paulos as it is in excess of the statutory amount.
IX.
A.

ARGUMENT

JENSEN DID NOT HAVE TO SHOW THAT PHILLIPS HAD ACTUAL
NOTICE OF THE SPECIFIC DANGER ON THIS OCCASION.

In general, there are two legal theories in which a landowner
may be found negligent and held liable for an invitee's injuries in
Utah.

The

first theory

involves

situations where there

is a

temporary or transient hazard on the property which was not created
by the landowner, its agents, or employees.

Under this theory, in

order to find a landowner negligent, it must be shown that the
landowner "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, of any hazardous condition and had reasonable opportunity to
remedy it."

See, Canfield, supra, Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 431

P.2d 566, 569 (1967); Accord, Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc. ,
538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531
P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1973); Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814
P.2d 623, 624 (UtahApp. 1991).
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In this

case, the

trial

court

found

that

the

conditions

complained of by Jensen were not such "an itinerant kind of act
that's there that the owner would have no notice of."

(T.110)

The

court stated, "I think, in fact, this is one of those cases where
the hazard essentially has been created by the owner, if in fact
one has been created, and therefore he has notice of that ..."
Mr. Jensen agrees with this portion of the trial

Id.

court's

finding that the first theory of liability is not applicable.
The

second

theory,

which

governs

this

case,

involves

situations where the landowner, its agents, or employees create or
are responsible for the dangerous condition.

Under this theory, a

plaintiff does not need to establish notice since a landowner is
deemed to have notice of the dangerous conditions it creates. See,
Canfield, supra.
This

theory

requires

that

the

landowner,

its agents, or

employees actually create the dangerous condition or defect that
results in an injury to a patron.

However, there is no logical

distinction between a situation in which the store owner directly
creates the defect, and where the landowner's method of operation
creates a situation where it is reasonably foreseeable that the
expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition
or defect.

Canfield.

It is evident from the facts in this case that the method of
11

operation at Phillips created a situation where it was reasonably
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties would create
a condition or defect:
(a)

Phillips knew that the truckers spilled fuel.

(b)

Phillips provided water to wash the fuel down, creating

the slippery condition.
(c)

(T.89).

(T.89).

The water would freeze, creating a slippery condition.

(T.96) .
The trial court found that "this is one of those cases where
the hazard essentially has been created by the owner, if in fact
one has been created . . . "

(T. 110)

For the court to then require in its instruction, over the
proposed instructions of both counsel, that the plaintiff must show
that

Phillips

knew or

should

have

known

of

the danger

on

that

particular day, flies in the face of Canfield.
Indeed, defense counsel used this instruction to his advantage
in arguing that the Phillips employee, Paul Hatch, had no notice of
the problem.

(T. 124, lines 6 - 12)

There was nothing for Paul [Hatch] to do in
this situation because he didn't know there
was a problem. You see, even after Mr. Jensen
injured himself, he didn't go to Paul.
He
didn't report the situation.
He didn't come
and tell us, 'Look, you have got a problem
over there.'
He loaded up, called
the
dispatcher to say he was done, went on his
way.
We didn't know.
How can we correct
something if we didn't know about it?
It's
12

his responsibility to come tell us if there is
a problem. Somebody else might encounter it.
Defense

counsel

continued

to argue

this

requirement

that

Phillips have notice, asserting contributory negligence on the part
of plaintiff

by stating plaintiff was required

somebody that there is a problem."

to,

"Go tell

(T. 126).

The purpose of Canfield was to remove this requirement of
knowledge argued by defense counsel; "to relieve the plaintiff of
the requirement of proving actual or constructive notice in such
instances is to affect a more equatable balance in regard to the
burdens of proof."
B.

See, Canfield at 227

(Citations omitted).

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS IN EXCESS OF THOSE
ALLOWED FOR BY STATUTE IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The court awarded costs for Dr. Paulos' deposition in the
amount

of

mileage.

$300.00.

The statutory witness

fee is $17.00 plus

(See, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 21-5-4, 21-5-8.)

An award of costs in excess of those expressly allowed by
statute for service of subpoena and witness fees is improper.
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) . Witness fees, travel
expenses, and service of process expenses are chargeable only in
accordance with the fee schedule set by statute. Morgan v. Morgan,
795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Mr. Jensen does not contest whether the deposition was taken
in good faith or essential for the development and presentation of
13

the case.
and

He does not contest that the deposition was reasonable

necessary.

He

does

contest

the

amount

awarded

for

the

deposition.
As explained in Frampton, where expert witnesses were paid in
excess of the subpoena rate.
There is a distinction to be understood
between the legitimate and taxable 'costs' and
other 'expenses,' of litigation which may be
ever so necessary but are not properly taxable
as costs. Consistent with that distinction,
the courts hold that expert witnesses cannot
be awarded extra compensation unless the
statute expressly provides. Frampton, at 774.
The Supreme Court has expressly forbidden taxing expert fees
in excess of that allowed by statute.
This court followed Frampton in 1990, in holding that witness
fees,

travel

expenses,

and

service

of

process

expenses

are

chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule set by statute.
See, Morgan v. Morgan, supra.
Further, it is not sufficient that the party be required to
pay costs to present its case. The "Utah Supreme Court has defined
costs to mean those fees which are required to be paid to the court
and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize
included

in the

judgment.

Morgan , citing

Frampton,

to be
at

774

(emphasis added).
Thus, it is a two part test requiring statutory authorization
to be taxed as costs.

Not only must the fees be required, the
14

statute must authorize them to be included in the judgment.

The

statute does not authorize Dr. Paulo's expert fee to be included in
the judgment as held in Frampton.
CONCLUSION
It was foreseeable that the acts of third persons created a
hazardous condition.
Phillips

be

shown

The requirement that notice on the part of
by

plaintiff,

as

stated

in

the

court's

instruction, is error.
The court also erred when it allowed a witness fee in excess
of that allowed by statute.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff/appellant John Jensen
respectfully requests that this court reverse the lower court's
decision granting the cost of $300.00 and reverse the jury verdict
due to the court's erroneous instruction.
DATED this Jo

day of June, 1994.

Ah* 0 ft.I

GLEN A. COOK
of and for
COOK & LAWRENCE, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Where the landowner's method of operation creates a situation
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of
third parties will create a dangerous condition or defect, the land
owner may be found negligent.
Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Ct. App. 1992)

Instruction No.
In determining whether a business owner was negligent,
the inquiry is whether the owner or its employees knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that a dangerous
condition existed, and whether sufficient time elapsed such that
corrective action could have been taken to remedy the situation.
Property owners are not insurers against all forms of accidents
that may happen to any who come.
Where the business owner chooses a method of operation
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of
third parties will create a dangerous condition, an injured party
need not prove either actual or constructive knowledge of the
specific condition.

In such a case, the relevant question is

whether the business owner took reasonable precautions to protect
customers against the dangerous condition.

INSTRUCTION NO.

,C

*

One who extends to a business invitee an invitation, express
or implied, is obliged to refrain from acts of negligence and to
exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a condition
reasonably safe for the business invitee and the personal
property of the business invitee brought to the premises in the
reasonable pursuit of a purpose embraced within the invitation.
The business invitee has a right to assume that the premises
to which the business invitee was invited are reasonably safe for
the purposes for which the invitation was extended, unless the
business invitee observes, or a reasonably prudent person in like
position would observe, conditions that caution otherwise.
The responsibility of one having control of the premises is
not absolute; it is not that of an insurer. If there is danger
associated with the entry, or the work which the business invitee
is to do on the premises, that arises from conditions not readily
apparent to the senses, and if the owner has actual knowledge of
such danger, or if such danger is discoverable by the owner in
the exercise of reasonable care, it is the duty of the owner to
give reasonable warning of such danger to the business invitee.
The owner is not bound to discover defects which reasonable
inspection would not disclose.

J
M
VAN

COTT,

BAGLEY,

CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Donald L. Dalton, #4305
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN COREY JENSEN,
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT OF JURY (TAXING
COSTS)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 920700394

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,

Honorable Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

This action was tried before a jury in the aboveentitled Court, the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding, on
February 16, 1994.

The jury entered its special verdict

finding that plaintiff s negligence exceeded that of defendant
and awarded him no damages.

Based on the jury' s special

verdict, the Court hereby orders that judgment be and is hereby
entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.
Within the time required by Rule 54(d)(2), U. R. C. P. ,
defendant filed its verified memorandum of costs to which
plaintiff objected.

For the reasons stated in a ruling on

defendant' s motion to tax costs, the Court taxes costs against
plaintiff in the amount of $704.00.

.JUDGMENT ENTERED
161X2511

00242530

DATED this c 4 5 ^ day of March, 1994.

A£^

Judge Rodjiey S. Page
Second Judicial District Court
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT OF JURY (TAXING COSTS) to be mailed, postage prepaid,
this 22nd day of March, 1994, to the following:
Glen A. Cook
Morris & Morris
4001 South 700 East #240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN COREY JENSEN,
plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO TAX COSTS

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,

Case No. 9207 00394

vs.

defendant.

Comes now the Court and having reviewed defendant's motion to tax costs, the
memorandum in support thereof, plaintiffs memorandum submitted in opposition thereto and
being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby rules as follows:
The plaintiff does not object to the costs of plaintiffs deposition as being a reasonably
necessary expense in defense of the case in question. The Court finds that it is was
reasonable and necessary and therefore grants the same. As to the costs of the deposition of
Dr. Lonnie Paulos, the Court finds that Dr. Paulos was plaintiffs expert and that his
deposition was reasonably necessary for the development of defendant's case. The Court
further finds that each of the parties relied upon the deposition of Dr. Paulos and allowed it
to be used in place of the personal appearance of Dr. Paulos. The Court therefore concludes
that the cost of his deposition together with the fee paid him to testify are both reasonable
and therefore allows the same. The Court denies the $100.00 appearance fee as there
appears no adequate explanation for the same and it appears unreasonable.

Defendant's counsel is to prepare an amended judgment which includes these costs
and submit the same to plaintiffs counsel at least five days prior to the time it is submitted
to the Court for signature.
Dated this Zt^r day of March, 1994.

J.£.

)r*Qu ^LL
District Coyrt Judge

^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling, on the
JLmm.

J}\ -~day of March, 1994, postage prepaid to the following:

Glen A. Cook
4001 South 700 East, #240
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

Donald L. Dalton
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Deputy Clerk

